Catholic University Law Review
Volume 70
Issue 4 Fall 2021

Article 10

12-31-2021

But We Didn’t Agree to That!: Why Class Proceedings Should Not
Be Implied from Silent or Ambiguous Arbitration Clauses After
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela
Andrea DeMelo Laprade
Catholic University of America (Student), laprade@cua.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview
Part of the Conflict of Laws Commons, Contracts Commons, Courts Commons, Judges Commons,
and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Andrea D. Laprade, But We Didn’t Agree to That!: Why Class Proceedings Should Not Be Implied from
Silent or Ambiguous Arbitration Clauses After Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 70 Cath. U. L. Rev. 697 (2021).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol70/iss4/10

This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

But We Didn’t Agree to That!: Why Class Proceedings Should Not Be Implied from
Silent or Ambiguous Arbitration Clauses After Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela
Cover Page Footnote
J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law (2021); M.A., Liberty University (2013);
B.A., College of the Holy Cross (2010). The author would like to thank God for His divine mercy; her
husband, Craig, for his unwavering support and patience; her parents, Serie and João, for their love and
the gift of education; and Professor Antonio Fidel Perez for providing her mind with a mental workout
during every feedback session. She would also like to give thanks to the editors and staff members of the
Catholic University Law Review for their stellar work during a difficult year and for assisting in the editing
of this Note.

This notes is available in Catholic University Law Review: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol70/iss4/10

BUT WE DIDN’T AGREE TO THAT!: WHY CLASS
PROCEEDINGS SHOULD NOT BE IMPLIED FROM
SILENT OR AMBIGUOUS ARBITRATION CLAUSES
AFTER LAMPS PLUS, INC. V. VARELA
Andrea DeMelo Laprade +

Arbitration clauses are everywhere. Almost everyone at some point has
agreed to individual arbitration in a consumer or employment contract. 1 The
usage of arbitration clauses is aided by the Supreme Court’s willingness to
enforce the scope of the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), 2 which provides that
arbitration agreements are enforceable by the courts. 3 But what happens when
consumers have a problem and want to proceed with arbitration as a class rather
than as individuals? Then, what if the arbitration clause in the contract
ostensibly does not say anything about class proceedings? The Supreme Court
held that bilateral arbitration is the default mode of arbitration “envisioned by
the FAA.” 4 Arbitration is “a matter of contract.” 5 The FAA “places arbitration
agreements on an equal footing with other contracts, . . . and requires courts to
enforce them according to their terms.” 6 As a result, the Court’s decisions
support the use of arbitration agreements to arbitrate on an individual basis and
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J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law (2021); M.A., Liberty
University (2013); B.A., College of the Holy Cross (2010). The author would like to thank God
for His divine mercy; her husband, Craig, for his unwavering support and patience; her parents,
Serie and João, for their love and the gift of education; and Professor Antonio Fidel Perez for
providing her mind with a mental workout during every feedback session. She would also like to
give thanks to the editors and staff members of the Catholic University Law Review for their stellar
work during a difficult year and for assisting in the editing of this Note.
1. E.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the
Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/
dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html; see also Richard Frankel, The
Arbitration Clause as Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 531, 550 (2014) (demonstrating how
arbitration clauses are used in many contexts and are “inserted in millions of contracts and are
pervasive in many spheres, including banking, credit cards, home building, investment advising,
cell phones, and auto dealers”).
2. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–307.
3. Id. § 2.
4. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011). The Supreme Court also
asserts that “class arbitration was not even envisioned by Congress when it passed the FAA.” Id.
at 349.
5. Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).
6. Id. (citing Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006); Volt Info.
Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989)).
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not in a collective proceeding unless the agreement specifically states
otherwise. 7
The purpose of this Note is to address how the Lamps Plus v. Varela decision
created more confusion about the question of class arbitrability and to argue that
the failure to address the particulars of the availability of class arbitration will
perpetuate litigation on this issue. This Note suggests that the FAA’s purpose
supports the Court’s current presumption against class arbitration if the parties
do not agree to it during the contracting process and that the use of contra
proferentem to create class arbitration is, therefore, contrary to the FAA’s
purpose.
Section I provides a brief overview of the FAA, Lamps Plus, and its
preemption holding. Section II walksthrough the existing case law regarding
class arbitration. Section III analyzes the usage of contra proferentem as
procedural and substantive law to achieve class arbitration and the preemption
of state law by federal law. Section IV demonstrates why courts should not
imply class proceedings when an arbitration clause is silent or ambiguous.
Finally, Section V concludes by making a case for the Supreme Court to clarify
its stance on class arbitration and the FAA’s preemptive effects so as to end
confusion for practitioners and judges alike.
I. THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES ON CLASS ARBITRATION ONCE AGAIN:
LAMPS PLUS V. VARELA, CONTRA PROFERENTEM, AND PREEMPTION
On April 24, 2019, the Supreme Court decided in Lamps Plus that shifting
from individual to class arbitration “fundamentally changes the nature of the
‘traditional individualized arbitration’ envisioned by the FAA” when an
arbitration clause is silent and is therefore ambiguous as to class arbitration. 8
Furthermore, the Court held that “an ambiguous agreement can[not] provide the
necessary ‘contractual basis’ for compelling class arbitration” and that the FAA
“requires more than ambiguity to ensure that the parties actually agreed to
arbitrate on a classwide basis.” 9
In Lamps Plus, the Supreme Court considered the interaction between the
FAA and California contract law, where “an agreement is ambiguous ‘when it
is capable of two or more constructions, both of which are reasonable.’” 10 The
Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision “based on California’s rule
that ambiguity in a contract should be construed against the drafter, a doctrine
7. See, e.g., Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 (2019); Am. Express Co. v.
Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 233 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333,
351 (2011); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010).
8. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1412 (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623
(2018)
9. Id. at 1415 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 664
(2009).
10. Id. at 1415–16 (quoting Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 F. App’x 670, 672 (9th Cir.
2017)).
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known as contra proferentem.” 11 The Court rejected the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning because contra proferentem does not resolve the ambiguity of the
party’s intent, but instead the ambiguity is resolved “based on public policy
factors, primarily equitable considerations about the parties’ relative bargaining
strength” by asking who drafted the agreement. 12 This analysis does not provide
a window into the parties’ consent; thus, the Court found that FAA preempted
the state law, creating a scheme “inconsistent with the FAA.” 13
The arbitration community was puzzled as to why the Supreme Court wanted
to review Lamps Plus because the Court had previously ruled on similar
circumstances in Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp. 14 The Lamps
Plus majority stated that Stolt-Nielsen’s reasoning controlled the decision. 15 In
Stolt-Nielsen, the Court ruled that when an arbitration agreement is “silent,” the
question of class arbitration must be based on the arbitrator’s construing of the
clause after “identify[ing] the rule of law that governs in that situation.” 16
Arbitrators are not to make public policy as “the task of an arbitrator is to
interpret and enforce a contract.” 17

11. Id. at 1417. The Court further reasoned that contra proferentem applies “only as a last
resort” when a contract “remains ambiguous after exhausting the ordinary methods of
interpretation.” Id.; see also 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (2021) (“The ‘contra proferentem’
device is intended to aid a party whose bargaining power was less than that of the draftsperson.”).
12. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417 (“[T]he FAA provides the default rule for resolving
ambiguity.”).
13. Id. at 1418. The Court relied on precedent, stating “that courts may not rely on state
contract principles to ‘reshape traditional individualized arbitration by mandating classwide
arbitration procedures without the parties’ consent.’” Id. (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S.
Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018)).
14. See Henry Allen Blair, Breaking News: SCOTUS Surprises Absolutely No One in Lamps
Plus, Inc. v. Varela, ARBITRATION NATION (Apr. 24, 2019), https://www.arbitrationnation.com/
breaking-news-scotus-surprises-absolutely-no-one-in-lamps-plus-inc-v-varela/. Mr. Blair points
out:
It’s not at all evident to me why SCOTUS felt the need to grant review of Lamps Plus,
Inc. v. Varela. But it did. And the majority decision, authored by Chief Justice
Roberts, did precisely what I think that everyone at the case expected: it held that the
courts cannot find the necessary consent to class arbitration in an ambiguous arbitration
clause.
Id.; see Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
15. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416.
16. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 673. But see Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444,
452 (2003) (“In certain limited circumstances, courts assume that the parties intended courts, not
arbitrators, to decide a particular arbitration-related matter . . . includ[ing] certain gateway matters,
such as whether the parties have a valid arbitration agreement.”).
17. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 672. When this happens, the Court reasoned that it “must
conclude that what the arbitration panel did was simply to impose its own view of sound policy
regarding class arbitration.” Id.
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II. A WALK THROUGH THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT AND AMBIGUOUS
ARBITRATION CLAUSES: THE COURT EXPANDS AND THEN LIMITS CLASS
ARBITRATION
The FAA was enacted in 1925 to enforce arbitration agreements after
observing “widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” 18 The FAA
states that “[a] written provision in . . . a contract evidencing a transaction . . . to
settle by arbitration, a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or
transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 19 The following
clause is colloquially known as the savings clause, which states that arbitration
agreements are enforceable “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.” 20 Since its enactment, the Supreme Court
has demonstrated a policy favoring arbitration. 21 Since the 1980s, the Court has
characterized the FAA as a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements.” 22 Despite this pro-arbitration viewpoint, the Court has imposed
limitations on how arbitration should proceed, particularly when arbitration
clauses are silent or ambiguous. 23
A. AT&T Technologies: Arbitrating Arbitrability
In AT&T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America, a union
sought to compel arbitration in a labor dispute regarding a grievance under the
terms of their collective bargaining agreement against an employer pursuant to
the Labor Management Relations Act. 24 The Communications Workers of
America filed a grievance against AT&T when they laid off seventy-nine
workers in Chicago, claiming that it would violate their agreement. 25 The
relevant arbitration clause was found in Article 8 of their agreement and stated
that “‘differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the
performance of any obligation hereunder’ must be referred to a mutually
agreeable arbitrator upon the written demand of either party.” 26

18. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
19. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
20. Id.
21. E.g., Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995). The Court states
here that the “FAA’s pro[-]arbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the
contracting parties.” Id.; see also Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (“The
FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”).
22. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); see also
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1418 (2019) (interpreting the FAA to require arbitration
clause interpretation to favor arbitration).
23. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (“[A]
party may not be compelled under the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual
basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”).
24. AT&T Techs. v. Commc’ns. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 644–46 (1986).
25. Id. at 645–46.
26. Id. at 644–45. The Court highlights other relevant provisions in the bargaining agreement:
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AT&T did not submit the grievance to arbitration because “the Company’s
decision to lay off workers when it determine[d] that a lack of work exists in a
facility [wa]s not arbitrable.” 27 The union subsequently filed suit in federal court
to compel arbitration and the district court, ruling on cross-motions for summary
judgment, found “that the ‘union’s interpretation . . . was at least “arguable,”’ .
. . [and] that it was ‘for the arbitrator, not the court to decide whether the union’s
interpretation has merit.’” 28 The district court ordered AT&T to arbitrate. 29 On
appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the lower court. 30 AT&T appealed to the
Supreme Court to answer “whether a collective-bargaining agreement create[d]
a duty for the parties to arbitrate the particular grievance,” and the Court reversed
the Court of Appeals’ decision. 31
Justice White wrote for a unanimous court and held that the Seventh Circuit
was incorrect to order the parties to arbitrate the arbitrability question because
that question was “undeniably an issue for judicial determination.” 32 It noted
that “[u]nless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise, the
question of whether the parties agreed to arbitrate is to be decided by the court,
not the arbitrator.” 33 The Court later reasoned:
It is the court’s duty to interpret the agreement and to determine
whether the parties intended to arbitrate grievances concerning layoffs
predicated on a “lack of work” determination by the Company. If the
court determines that the agreement so provides, then it is for the
arbitrator to determine the relative merits of the parties’ substantive
interpretations of the agreement. It was for the court, not the arbitrator,
to decide in the first instance whether the dispute was to be resolved
through arbitration. 34

Article 9 provides that, “subject to the limitations contained in the provisions of this
contract, but otherwise not subject to the provisions of the arbitration clause,” AT&T
is free to exercise certain management functions, including the hiring and placement
of employees and the termination of employment. “When lack of work necessitates
Layoff,” Article 20 prescribes the order in which employees are to be laid off.
Id. at 645 (footnotes omitted).
27. Id. at 646.
28. Id. at 647.
29. Id.
30. Id.; see Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. W. Elec. Co., 475 U.S. 643 (1986). Here, the Court
notes that the Seventh Circuit “acknowledged the ‘general rule’ that the issue of arbitrability is for
the courts to decide unless the parties stipulate otherwise, but noted that this Court’s decisions . . .
caution courts to avoid becoming entangled in the merits of a labor dispute under the guise of
deciding arbitrability.” Id. at 647 (first citing Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1960); and then citing Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960)).
31. Id. at 648–49.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 649.
34. Id. at 651.
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The Court further explained that “where the contract contains an arbitration
clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability . . . ‘unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute . . . . [But d]oubts should be
resolved in favor of coverage.’” 35
Justice Brennan wrote a concurrence to “supplement what has been said in
order to avoid any misunderstandings on remand and in future cases.” 36 He
reasoned that “[t]he Seventh Circuit misunderstood these rules of contract
construction” and performed its analysis contrary to precedent because
“determining arbitrability does not require the court even to consider which
party is correct with respect to the meaning of [an arbitration clause].” 37
Although Justice Brennan attempted to clarify any misunderstandings on
remand and for future cases, the misunderstandings and confusion remain today.
B. First Options: No Clear Agreement About Arbitrability Means That the
Court May Review the Dispute
In First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, a couple was required to pay the
entire debt of their wholly-owned investment company and their stock trading
clearinghouse after the October 1987 stock market crash. 38 The Kaplans, their
company, MKI, and the clearinghouse, First Options, entered into a “workout”
agreement to pay the debts owed to First Options due to the crash. 39 First
Options demanded the MKI debt, insisted that the Kaplans pay any deficiency,
and when that did not work, First Options went to arbitration. 40 The workout
plan consisted of four documents, only one of which contained an arbitration
clause. 41 MKI signed that document, but the Kaplans did not. 42 Since MKI
signed the document containing the arbitration clause, MKI accepted
arbitration. 43 However, the Kaplans denied that their disagreement was
arbitrable and filed written objections to the arbitration panel. 44 Ultimately, the
arbitration panel decided that they had the power to arbitrate and ruled in First
Options’ favor. 45
35. Id. at 650 (quoting Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582–83).
36. Id. at 652.
37. Id. at 654–55. Justice Brennan further explaind in his concurrence that “because the
parties have submitted to us only fragmentary pieces of the bargaining history, we are not in a
position properly to evaluate whether there is ‘the most forceful evidence’ that the parties did not
intend for this dispute to be arbitrable.” Id. at 655–56.
38. First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 940 (1995).
39. Id. at 941.
40. Id. at 940.
41. Id. at 941.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The arbitration panel concluded that “they had the power to rule on the merits of the
parties’ dispute.” Id.
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Both parties petitioned the federal district court; the Kaplans asked the court
to vacate the arbitration award, whereas First Options requested confirmation. 46
The District Court confirmed First Options’ award, but the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the District Court. 47 The Third Circuit agreed with the
Kaplans that their dispute was, in fact, not arbitrable. 48 First Options then
appealed to the Supreme Court to review the arbitrability determination. 49
Here, a unanimous Supreme Court held that “the law treats silence or
ambiguity about the question ‘who (primarily) should decide arbitrability’
differently from the way it treats silence or ambiguity about the question
‘whether a particular merits-related dispute is arbitrable because it is within the
scope of a valid arbitration agreement.’” 50 The Court reasoned that because
there was not a clear agreement between the Kaplans and First Options, it
affirmed the Third Circuit “in finding that the arbitrability of the Kaplan/First
Options dispute was subject to independent review by the courts.” 51
C. Bazzle: Is Class Arbitration Forbidden or Is the Contract Silent?
When a couple asked a South Carolina court to certify their claim as a class
action against a loan provider in Green Tree Financial Corporation v. Bazzle,
they objected to the loan company’s failure to provide them with a required
form. 52 This form would have allowed them to name their own lawyers and
insurance agents during their loan transactions. 53 The arbitration clause
included in the contract between the Bazzles and Green Tree Financial
Corporation stated the following:
ARBITRATION—All disputes, claims, or controversies arising from
or relating to this contract or the relationships which result from this
contract . . . shall be resolved by binding arbitration by one arbitrator
selected by us with consent of you. This arbitration contract is made
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 944–45 (emphasis in original); see also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24) (“[T]he first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute to is
determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute . . . . [B]y applying the ‘federal
substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the
Act.’”).
51. First Options, 514 U.S. at 947. The Court refuted First Options’ argument that the FAA
“requires a presumption that the Kaplans agreed to be bound by the arbitrators’ decision, not the
contrary.” Id. at 946. The Court reasoned that “the basic objective in this area is not to resolve
disputes in the quickest manner possible, no matter what the parties’ wishes, . . . but to ensure that
commercial arbitration agreements, like other contracts, ‘are enforced’ . . . according to the
intentions of the parties.” Id. at 947 (citations omitted).
52. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 447–48 (2003).
53. Id. at 448.
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pursuant to a transaction in interstate commerce, and shall be governed
by the Federal Arbitration Act at 9 U.S.C. section 1 [9 U.S.C.S. § 1] .
. . . THE PARTIES VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVE
ANY RIGHT THEY HAVE TO A JURY TRIAL, EITHER
PURSUANT TO ARBITRATION UNDER THIS CLAUSE OR
PURSUANT TO COURT ACTION BY US (AS PROVIDED
HEREIN) . . . . The parties agree and understand that the arbitrator
shall have all powers provided by the law and the contract. These
powers shall include all legal and equitable remedies, including, but
not limited to, money damages, declaratory relief, and injunctive
relief. 54
The South Carolina trial court certified a class action and entered an order
compelling arbitration. 55 The arbitrator administered the subsequent
proceedings as a class arbitration and awarded the class with statutory damages
and attorney’s fees. 56 The trial court confirmed this award and was then
appealed. 57 Green Tree’s argument was that class arbitration was “legally
impermissible,” but the South Carolina Supreme Court withdrew the case from
the Court of Appeals and subsequently held that “the contracts were silent in
respect to class arbitration, . . . authorized class arbitration, and that arbitration
had properly taken that form.” 58
In a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Breyer, the Court considered if the South
Carolina Supreme Court’s decision was consistent with the FAA. 59 The Court
reasoned that contrary to the South Carolina Trial Court’s decision, it did not
think that the contract’s language clearly authorized class arbitration. 60 The
Court explained that it could not “automatically accept the South Carolina
Supreme Court’s resolution of this contract-interpretation question” and that it
was for the arbitrator to resolve, not a court. 61
After performing an analysis of the contract and the parties’ agreement, the
Court concluded that because the arbitration contract issue was a dispute
“‘relating to this contract’ and the resulting ‘relationships,’” then the parties
54. Id.
55. Id. at 449.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 450.
58. Id. at 449–50. The Court observed the difference between an individual and bilateral
arbitration, noting that “class arbitration involves an arbitration, not simply between Green Tree
and a named customer, but also between Green Tree and other (represented) customers, all taking
place before the arbitrator chosen to arbitrate the initial, named customer’s dispute.” Id. at 450–
51.
59. Id. at 450.
60. Id. at 453–54.
61. Id. at 451. The Court initially asked whether “the contracts [were] in fact silent, or . . .
[if] they forb[ade] class arbitration,” and reasoned that although it was “important to resolve that
question . . . [it could not] do so, not simply because it is a matter of state law, but also because it
is a matter for the arbitrator to decide.” Id. at 447.
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ostensibly had “agreed that an arbitrator, not a judge, would answer the relevant
question.” 62 The majority distinguished the case from First Options, stating that
“[u]nlike First Options, the question is not whether the parties wanted a judge
or an arbitrator to decide whether they agreed to arbitrate a matter . . . . Rather
the relevant question here is what kind of arbitration proceeding the parties
agreed to.” 63 The Court further highlighted the broad language in the contract
at issue which dictated that “[a]ll disputes, claims, or controversies arising from
or relating to this contract or the relationships which result[ed] from [it],” and
concluded that the issue was not a question of arbitrability, but an issue
concerning contract interpretation and arbitration procedures. 64
While the majority in Bazzle was clear that the issue was for the arbitrator to
decide, the dissent, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by Justices
O’Connor and Kennedy, maintained that the question was for the courts, not the
arbitrator, to determine if the arbitration as agreed to could proceed as a class
arbitration. 65 This dissent also contends that “the holding of the Supreme Court
of South Carolina contravenes the terms of the contract and is therefore preempted by the FAA.” 66 In the second dissent, written by Justice Thomas, he
noted that the FAA “does not apply to proceedings in state courts” and therefore
“cannot be a ground for pre-empting a state court’s interpretation of a private
arbitration agreement.” 67 Justice Thomas would express his disagreement with
the Court’s application of preemption law in subsequent cases. 68
D. Stolt-Nielsen: A Contractual Basis is Required to Compel Class
Arbitration under the FAA
In the Supreme Court’s decision preceding Lamps Plus, Stolt-Nielsen, the
petitioners were shipping companies that disputed “a standard contract known
in the maritime world as a ‘charter party,’” with one of their customers,
AnimalFeeds. 69 The charter party used by AnimalFeeds is known as the
“Vegilvoy” and contained the following arbitration clause:

62. Id. at 451–52. Furthermore, the Court here distinguished Bazzle from First Options,
reasoning that “[t]he question here . . . concern[ed] neither the validity of the arbitration clause nor
its applicability to the underlying dispute between the parties.” Id. at 452.
63. Id. (citation omitted).
64. Id. at 456 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. Id. at 455–56 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 455 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 460 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68. see, e.g., Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 459 (2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that he has become “increasing[ly] reluctan[t] to expand federal statutes beyond
their terms through doctrines of implied pre-emption.”); Pharmaceutical Rsch. and Mfrs. Of Am.
v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644, 678 (2003) (Thomas, J. concurring) (explaining that there is a “concomitant
danger of invoking obstacle pre-emption based on the arbitrary selection of one purpose to the
exclusion of others.”).
69. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Intl’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666–67 (2010).
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Arbitration. Any dispute arising from the making, performance or
termination of this Charter Party shall be settled in New York, Owner
and Charterer each appointing an arbitrator, who shall be a merchant,
broker or individual experienced in the shipping business; the two thus
chosen, if they cannot agree, shall nominate a third arbitrator who shall
be an Admiralty lawyer. Such arbitration shall be conducted in
conformity with the provisions and procedure of the United States
Arbitration Act [i.e., the FAA], and a judgment of the Court shall be
entered upon any award made by said arbitrator. 70
In 2003, Stolt-Nielsen was found in a Department of Justice criminal
investigation to have engaged in an “illegal price-fixing conspiracy.” 71
AnimalFeeds, on behalf of a class of similarly-situated plaintiffs, filed suit in the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, “asserting antitrust
claims for supracompetitive prices” that Stolt-Nielsen had allegedly charged
their customers. 72 Other charterers brought suits in other federal courts, and in
the District Court for the District of Connecticut, the court held that the claims
were not subject to arbitration, but the Second Circuit subsequently reversed. 73
Soon after, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated all of the
actions against Stolt-Nielsen, which included the AnimalFeeds suit. 74 It was
undisputed between the parties that after the federal court judgments and orders,
AnimalFeeds and the other charterers “must arbitrate their antitrust dispute.” 75
In 2005, Stolt-Nielsen was served a demand for class arbitration by
AnimalFeeds. 76 Then “[t]he parties entered into a supplemental agreement,”
which agreed to submit the question of class arbitration “to a panel of three
arbitrators.” 77 Both Stolt-Nielsen and AnimalFeeds “stipulated that the
arbitration clause was ‘silent’ with respect to class arbitration,” and
AnimalFeeds argued, “that the term ‘silent’ did not simply mean that the clause
made no express reference to class arbitration . . . . [But] the parties agree that
70. Id. The Court explained that Stolt-Nielsen “assert[ed], without contradiction, that
charterers like AnimalFeeds, or their agents—not the shipowners—typically select the particular
charter party that governs their shipments.” Id.
71. Id. at 667.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163 (2d Cir. 2004).
74. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 668; see In re Parcel Tanker Shipping Servs. Antitrust Litig.,
296 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (J.P.M.L. 2003).
75. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 668.
76. Id. AnimalFeeds sought to represent a class of “[a]ll direct purchasers of parcel tanker
transportation services globally for bulk liquid chemicals, edible oils, acids, and other specialty
liquids from [petitioners] at any time during the period from August 1, 1988, to November 30,
2002.” Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp, 548 F.3d 85, 87 (2d Cir. 2008),
rev’d, 559 U.S. 662 (2010)) (alteration in original).
77. Id. The agreement stipulated that the arbitration panel was to “follow and be bound by
Rules 3 through 7 of the American Arbitration Association’s Supplementary Rules for Class
Arbitrations.” Id.
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when a contract is silent on an issue there’s been no agreement that has been
reached on that issue.” 78
The arbitrators, relying on the Bazzle decision and the fact that “other
arbitrators ruling after Bazzle had construed ‘a wide variety of clauses in a wide
variety of settings as allowing for class arbitration,’” concluded that the
arbitration clause in the case at hand allowed for class arbitration. 79
Furthermore, the arbitrators reasoned that Stolt-Nielsen did not “show an
‘inten[t] to preclude class arbitration.’” 80
The parties sought judicial review, and Stolt-Nielsen filed an application to
vacate the arbitrator’s award in the District Court for the Southern District of
New York. 81 The District Court vacated the award, reasoning that “the
arbitrators’ decision was made in ‘manifest disregard’ of the law insofar as the
arbitrators failed to conduct a choice-of-law analysis.” 82 The court held that the
arbitrators would have “applied the rule of federal maritime law requiring that
contracts be interpreted in light of custom and usage” if the arbitrators had
conducted the analysis. 83 AnimalFeeds appealed this to the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals, which reversed on the grounds that Stolt-Nielsen had not cited
any federal maritime rule of custom and usage against class arbitration. 84
Upon review, the Supreme Court majority held that even though there is a
deferential standard applicable to judicial review of arbitrator’s decisions, the
arbitration panel “exceeded [its] powers” by imposing its own policy choice on
the issue of class arbitration availability. 85 The majority also commented that
the reliance on Bazzle was perhaps ineffective since “only the plurality” had
decided that “an arbitrator, not a court, [should] decide whether a contract
permits arbitration” but declined to revisit the question since Stolt-Nielsen and
AnimalFeeds explicitly requested the arbitrator to determine whether class
action was permitted. 86 The Court concluded that because there was no
agreement on the question of class arbitration, finding an implicit agreement
where a provision was otherwise silent on the issue was not advisable due to the
fundamental differences between individual and class arbitration. 87

78. Id. at 668–69.
79. Id. at 669. However, the panel noted that “none of these decisions was ‘exactly
comparable’ to the present dispute.” Id.
80. Id. (alteration in original).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 670.
84. Id. at 667, 670.
85. Id. at 671–72.
86. Id. at 680.
87. Id. at 685–87.
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E. Write What You Mean: Contract Silence and Ambiguity Toward Class
Arbitration Precludes Its Availability in Lamps Plus
Lamps Plus added to the growing line of class arbitration cases. 88 This time,
the issue focused on the FAA and its potential foreclosure of a state law
arbitration agreement that would authorize class arbitration based solely on
general language commonly used in arbitration agreements. 89
Lamps Plus is a seller of light fixtures and related products. 90 In 2016, a
hacker gained access to a Lamps Plus computer system and obtained “the tax
information of approximately 1,300 other employees.” 91 As a result, a
fraudulent tax return was filed in a Lamps Plus employee’s name, Frank Varela,
and Varela filed legal action against Lamps Plus. 92
Varela filed a class action complaint against Lamps Plus on March 29, 2016. 93
Lamps Plus responded by filing a Motion to Compel Arbitration on an individual
basis because, as a condition of employment, Varela signed various documents,
including an arbitration agreement. 94 The arbitration agreement stated:
The Company and I mutually consent to the resolution by arbitration
of all claims or controversies (“claims”), past, present or future that I
may have against the Company or against its officers, directors,
employees or agents in their capacity as such, or otherwise, or that the
Company may have against me. Specifically, the Company and I
mutually consent to the resolution by arbitration of all claims that may
hereafter arise in connection with my employment, or any of the
parties’ rights and obligations arising under this Agreement. 95
Varela did not contest that he signed these documents, including the
arbitration agreement. 96 However, he contended that he “d[id] not remember
signing this document or having its contents explained to him,” and that he “d[id]
not remember being advised by anyone from Lamps Plus to consult an attorney
prior to signing the arbitration provision.” 97
88. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1412 (2019).
89. Id. at 1415.
90. Id. at 1412.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1412–13.
93. Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., CV 16-577-DMG (KSx), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 189521, at
*1 (C.D. Cal. Jul. 7, 2016), rev’d, 771 F. App’x. 418 (9th Cir. 2019) (Mem).
94. Id. at *2–3 (“The [Lamps Plus] Arbitration Agreement states that part of its ‘employment
practice is agreeing to abide by the terms in the Arbitration Agreement,’” and [that] “an employee
should therefore, ‘read this agreement and be willing to sign it if an employment offer is made.’”).
95. Id. at *3–4 (“The Agreement further state[d], in all capital letters: ‘I UNDERSTAND
THAT I HAVE THREE (3) DAYS FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THIS AGREEMENT TO
REVOKE THIS AGREEMENT AND THAT THIS AGREEMENT SHALL NOT BECOME
EFFECTIVE OR ENFORCEABLE UNTIL THE REVOCATION PERIOD HAS EXPIRED.’”).
96. Id. at *2–3.
97. Id. at *3.
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The district court evaluated Varela’s arguments to invalidate the agreement
due to unconscionability, which is outside the scope of this paper. 98 However,
it is worth noting the district court ruled that “[t]he Arbitration Agreement [wa]s
not substantively unconscionable, and raise[d] only the most minimal concerns
about procedural unconscionability . . . . [And] it w[ould] therefore not be
invalidated on this basis.” 99 As to the evaluation of the arbitration agreement,
the court stated that “‘[i]t is the court’s duty to interpret the agreement and to
determine whether the parties intended to arbitrate[.]’” 100 The court cited to a
Ninth Circuit opinion which stated that “[w]e interpret the contract by applying
general state-law principles of contract interpretation, while giving due regard
to the federal policy in favor of arbitration by resolving ambiguities as to the
scope of arbitration in favor of arbitration.” 101
The District Court relied on Stolt-Nielsen’s holding and recognized that when
a clause is “‘silent’ as to class arbitration, ‘the parties cannot be compelled to
submit their dispute to class arbitration.’” 102 However, the court distinguished
Lamps Plus from Stolt-Nielsen because the parties in Stolt-Nielsen themselves
expressly stipulated that there was “no agreement” as to class arbitration. 103 The
court further observed that that “[c]ourts have therefore limited Stolt-Nielsen to
cases where an arbitration agreement is ‘silent in the sense that [the parties] had
not reached any agreement on the issue of class arbitration, not simply . . . that
the clause made no express reference to class arbitration.” 104 The court agreed
with Varela that the agreement’s language was ambiguous as to class claims,
and the court employed the doctrine of contra proferentem to the agreement
according to the court’s application of California precedent, which states that
“the drafter of an adhesion contract must be held responsible for any ambiguity
in the agreement.” 105
The Supreme Court held that ambiguous agreements cannot compel class
arbitration under the FAA. 106 The Court reinforced the principle in prior cases
that “class arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by [state law] rather than
consensual, is inconsistent with the FAA,” 107 and that “courts may not rely on

98. See id. at *10–17.
99. Id. at *17.
100. Id. at *8 (quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers of Am. 475 U.S. 643, 651
(1986)) (alteration in original).
101. Id. at *8–9 (quoting Wagner v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. 83 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir.
1996)).
102. Id. at *18 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687
(2010)).
103. Id. at *18–19.
104. Id. at *18 (quoting Yahoo! Inc. v. Iversen, 836 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1011 (N.D. Cal. 2011))
(some alterations in original).
105. Id. at *19 (citing Jacobs v. Fire Ins. Exch., 42 Cal. Rptr. 2d 906, 921 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995)).
106. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019).
107. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011).
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state contract principles to ‘reshape traditional individual arbitration by
mandating classwide arbitration procedures without the parties’ consent.’” 108
Furthermore, the Court scolded the lower court’s application of contra
proferentem because it “require[ed] class arbitration on the basis of a doctrine
that ‘does not help to determine the meaning that the two parties gave to the
words, or even the meaning that a reasonable person would have given to the
language used.’” 109 As a result, the state law was preempted because it stood
“‘as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and
objectives’ of the FAA.” 110
Justice Thomas filed a concurrence in this case because he disagreed with the
majority’s reasoning. He wrote from a textualist perspective that “the arbitration
agreement between Varela and Lamps Plus is silent as to class arbitration. If
anything, the agreement suggests that the parties contemplated only bilateral
arbitration.” 111 Accordingly, Justice Thomas would have reversed the lower
courts on the basis that there was “no ‘contractual basis’ for concluding that the
parties agreed to class arbitration.” 112 He voiced his concern about the
majority’s application of implied preemption precedent and its decision to
reverse based on California’s contra proferentem rule but joined in the opinion
“because it correctly applies [the] FAA precedents.” 113
IV. THE COURT MUST DECIDE WHETHER THE USAGE OF CONTRA
PROFERENTEM IS PROCEDURAL OR SUBSTANTIVE AND IF THE FAA DISALLOWS
ITS USE
Jurisdictions are split over the question of whether clause construction is a
matter of procedural or substantive arbitrability. 114 “[T]he Second and Ninth
Circuits have held that Bazzle remains good law; . . . [and] they . . . allocate
clause construction to the arbitrator.” 115 However, “the Third, Fourth, Sixth,
Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have predicted that the Court is just ‘a short step
away from the conclusion that whether an arbitration agreement authorizes class
arbitration . . . requires judicial review.’” 116 While examining intent, these
circuits “reason[ed] that judges, not arbitrators, should decide . . . whether a

108. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1418 (quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623
(2018)).
109. Id. (quoting 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 559, 269–70 (1960)).
110. Id. at 1415 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352).
111. Id. at 1419 (Thomas, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 1419–20.
113. Id. at 1420.
114. David Horton, Clause Construction: A Glimpse Into Judicial and Arbitral DecisionMaking, 68 DUKE L.J. 1323, 1355 (2019).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1356 (quoting Herrington v. Waterstone Mortg. Corp., 907 F.3d 502, 507 (7th Cir.
2018)) (alteration in original).
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silent arbitration clause allows class procedures.” 117 Lamps Plus did not provide
the answer to this question.
Clause construction is difficult to classify as either a matter of substantive or
procedural arbitrability. 118 According to Corbin on Contracts, “[t]hrough
‘interpretation’ of a contract, a court determines what meanings the parties,
when contracting, gave to the language used. Through ‘construction’ of a
contract, a court determines the legal operation of the contract—its effect upon
the rights and duties of the parties.” 119
The Court has used several approaches to distinguish the two. By highlighting
one of the FAA’s major goals to “move the parties to an arbitrable dispute out
of court and into arbitration as quickly as possible,” this would lead to the
presumption that the arbitrator should perform this task. Arguably, having an
arbitrator interpret an arbitration agreement allows disputes to take place in one
forum. 120 On the other hand, “the Court has [also] suggested that arbitrators
should hear matters that they are better equipped than judges to decide.” 121 In
Bazzle, the Court relied on the expertise of the adjudicators. 122 The Court
observed that arbitrators are “experts in ‘contract interpretation and arbitration
procedures.’” 123 Since Bazzle, “several courts have deemed clause construction
to be a matter of procedural arbitrability on the grounds that arbitrators excel at
determining the parties’ intent.” 124
Party intent is another factor influencing whether a question is for the courts
or the arbitrators. 125 There is inconsistency among the courts when interpreting
silent arbitration clauses. While some “federal appellate courts have found that
interpreting a silent arbitration clause is crucial because there is a ‘fundamental
difference’ between two-party and class arbitration,” 126 other courts view class
actions as “a mere procedural device that leaves the ‘parties’ legal rights and
duties intact and the rules of decision unchanged.’” 127 Therefore, the class
procedure does not allow the application of intent to clause construction, further
muddling the answer to this question.
117. Id.
118. See 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.3 (2021) ( “Although these two words are most often
used synonymously, a distinction between them does exist.”).
119. Id.
120. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 22 (1983).
121. See Horton, supra note 114, at 1369. See also Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S.
444, 452–53 (2003) (explaining that “[a]rbitrators are well situated to” resolve questions of contract
interpretation).
122. See Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 454.
123. Horton, supra note 114, at 1369 (quoting Bazzle, 539 U.S. at 453).
124. Id.
125. E.g., First Options of Chi., Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
126. Horton, supra note 114, at 1370 (quoting Dell Webb Cmtys., Inc. v. Carlson, 817 F.3d
867, 876 (4th Cir. 2016)).
127. Id. at 1370–71 (quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S.
393, 408 (2010)).
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A. Contra Proferentem:Punishing the Drafter to Protect the “Underdog”
In Lamps Plus and Stolt-Nielsen, the courts invoked the doctrine of contra
proferentem to construe silence in a contract against the draftsman. 128 However,
contra proferentem’s “application does not assist in determining the meaning
that the two parties gave to the words, or even the meaning that a reasonable
person would have assigned to the language used.” 129 Commentators and judges
have stated that contra proferentem is “a policy-driven attempt to ‘favor[] the
underdog.’” 130
In Lamps Plus, the arbitration clause was ambiguous. 131 The Court’s analysis
considered the nature of arbitration and the purpose of the FAA, as well as the
Ninth Circuit’s application of the state law contra proferentem doctrine to reach
this conclusion. 132 Notably, the Lamps Plus court rejected the lower court’s
application of the contract doctrine. 133 The open question for the Court, then, is
how to reconcile the different state contract law views of contra proferentem
throughout the country, as well as whether its usage when evaluating an
arbitration clause that is silent or ambiguous on class proceedings. Do these
principles mean that contra proferentem should never be used because the FAA
forbids it? If these lines of cases hold that contra proferentem is an
impermissible doctrine to use in cases invoking the FAA, the Court must clarify
this.
B. The Federal Arbitration Act and Individualized Versus Class Arbitration
The FAA was enacted in 1925 to enforce arbitration agreements after
observing “widespread judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” 134 Since its
enactment, the Supreme Court has demonstrated a policy favoring arbitration. 135
Court precedent states that the FAA requires courts to enforce arbitration
128. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1417 (2019); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010). In general, contra proferentem applies with
special force to adhesion contracts. See David Horton, Flipping the Script: Contra Proferentem
and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431, 440–46 (2009) (collecting pre-StoltNielsen cases invoking contra proferentem); see, e.g., Tahoe Nat’l Bank v. Phillips, 480 P.2d 320,
327 (Cal. 1971) (“Since the alleged ambiguities appear in a standardized contract, drafted and
selected by the bank, which occupies the superior bargaining position, those ambiguities must be
interpreted against the bank.”).
129. 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (2021).
130. Horton, supra note 114, at 1376 (quoting 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (1998))
(alteration in original).
131. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1412.
132. Id. at 1417.
133. Id. at 1417.
134. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
135. See Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 57 (1995). The Court states
here “that the FAA’s pro[-]arbitration policy does not operate without regard to the wishes of the
contracting parties.” Id.; see also Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010) (The
FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract”).
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agreements according to their terms, but if the terms of an arbitration agreement
are silent as to the availability of class arbitration, then courts may not compel
parties to submit to class arbitration. 136 The Court did not shut the door to class
arbitration, but it maintained that parties should “not be compelled under the
FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for
concluding that the party agreed to do so.” 137 The FAA envisioned “traditional
individualized arbitration,” 138 and defaulting to class arbitration when an
agreement is ambiguous or silent would go against the FAA’s intent. 139 The
Court expanded on this characterization, stating that “class arbitration sacrifices
the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and makes the process
slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final
judgment.” 140
C. Lamps Plus and Contra Proferentem
The doctrine of contra proferentem, or interpretation against that draftsman,
is defined in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 206 in the following
manner: “[i]n choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or
agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates
against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise
proceeds.” 141 It is employed by courts as a last resort when searching for the
parties’ intended meaning in situations where agreements are silent or
ambiguous, and normally is applied after examining other factors such as
“general, local, technical and trade usages and custom, and including the
evidence of relevant circumstances which must be admitted and weighed.” 142
Contra proferentem is more often than not utilized as a device to equalize
bargaining power between parties, particularly “to aid a party whose bargaining
power was less than that of the draftsperson,” 143 like Varela in Lamps Plus. 144
Varela and his co-workers signed an arbitration agreement in their employment
contract as a condition of employment. 145 Like many employment contracts, the
Lamps Plus contract was an example of a standard-form agreement, or an
adhesion contract, which is “prepared by one party, to be signed by another party
in a weaker position . . . who adheres to the contract with little choice about the
136. Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684.
137. Id. (emphasis in original).
138. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1412 (2019).
139. Id. at 1417, 1419.
140. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348 (2011). The Supreme Court also
asserted that “class arbitration was not even envisioned by Congress when it passed the FAA.” Id.
at 349.
141. Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 206 (Am. Law Inst. 1981).
142. 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (2021).
143. Id.
144. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1412–13.
145. Id. at 1413.
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terms.” 146 Prior to Lamps Plus, the state and lower courts applied California law
based on another arbitration case, Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive, Inc., which
concluded that ambiguity is construed against the drafter, a rule that “applies
with peculiar force in the case of a contract of adhesion.” 147 Before the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court in Lamps
Plus “[b]ecause the Agreement [wa]s capable of two reasonable constructions,
[and therefore] the district court correctly found ambiguity.” 148 Thus, when
applying California state law, the interpretation would be against Lamps Plus
because it drafted the agreement. 149
The Court criticized the California usage of contra proferentem because
“[u]nlike contract rules that help to interpret the meaning of a term, and thereby
uncover the intent of the parties, contra proferentem is by definition triggered
only after a court determines that it cannot discern the intent of the parties.” 150
The majority further described the doctrine as providing “a default rule based on
public policy,” which would ultimately not reveal the parties’ intent and
therefore cannot be used as proof of consent under the FAA. 151
Contract law, like property and tort law, is generally governed by state laws.
Contra proferentem is a doctrine of contract law, and the states are free to apply
it as they wish. Contract law involves the study of interpretation and
construction. 152 “Interpretation” of a contract is when “a court determines what
meanings the parties, when contracting, gave to the language used.” 153
“Construction” of a contract is when “a court determines the legal operation of
the contract—its effect upon the rights and duties of the parties.” 154
Construction of a contract includes the interpretation of language, while
interpretation does not determine party relationships. 155 States are not on the
same page when it comes to classifying to which category contra proferentem
belongs, and this fact illustrates the variations of contract law in each state. 156

146. Adhesion Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
147. Sandquist v. Lebo Auto., Inc., 376 P.3d 506, 514 (Cal. 2016) (quoting Graham v. ScissorTail, Inc. 623 P.2d 165, 172 n.16 (Cal. 1981) (en banc)). The California Supreme Court held in
this case that an employment-related arbitration provision that was silent as to whether the
availability of class arbitration was to be resolved by a court or an arbitrator had to be interpreted
against the employer as the drafter pursuant to California Civil Code, Section 1654, when an
employee argued that the issue was for the arbitrator. Id.
148. Varela v. Lamps Plus, Inc., 701 F. App’x 670, 673 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 771 F. App’x
418 (Mem) (2019).
149. Id.
150. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417 (emphasis in original).
151. Id.
152. See 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.23 (2021).
153. Id. at § 24.3.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See e.g., Id. at § 24.27.
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For example, in New Jersey, contra proferentem is a rule of contract
interpretation, whereas in New York, it is a rule of contract construction. 157
D. Preemption of Contra Proferentem
The Constitution’s Supremacy Clause is the foundation for federal preemption
in which federal law supersedes conflicting state laws. 158 One commentator
remarked that “[w]hile the supremacy clause’s mandate rings clear, preemption
issues are not always obvious or easily resolved.” 159 There are several ways in
which federal law may preempt state law. Preemption is unequivocal “where
federal law explicitly says that it preempts state law.” 160 It is inferred when “one
can imply a clear congressional intent to preempt state or local law.” 161
There are two types of implied preemption: “field preemption” and “conflict
preemption.” 162 Field preemption occurs when “the federal regulatory scheme
is so pervasive that it supports the reasonable inference that Congress intended
that the states could not supplement it.” 163 Conflict preemption, also known as
obstacle preemption, occurs when “a regulated entity cannot physically comply
with both federal and state regulations or ‘where state law stands as an obstacle
to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objective of
Congress.’” 164 In Lamps Plus, the Court rejected the usage of contra
proferentem because it was an obstacle to Congress’s purpose and objectives of
the FAA. 165
Generally, “courts start with a presumption against preemption—in
recognition of the limited power of the federal government and the primary
authority of the states.” 166 “In its obstacle preemption cases, the Court has held
that state law can interfere with federal goals by frustrating Congress’s goal . . .
of establishing a regulatory ‘ceiling’ for certain products or activities, or by

157. See Caitlin Specialty Ins. Co. v. QA3 Fin. Corp., 36 F. Supp. 3d 336, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 2014)
(quoting 5 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (1998)) (finding under New York state common law
that contra proferentem “‘is not actually [a rule] of interpretation’ as ‘its application does not assist
in determining the meaning that the two parties gave to the words, or even the meaning that a
reasonable person would have assigned to the language used’”). Cf. Pacifico v. Pacifico, 920 A.2d
73 (N.J. 2007) (illustrating that, in New Jersey, the “rule of [ambiguous] contract interpretation
requires a court to adopt the meaning that is most favorable to the non-drafting party”).
158. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
159. LAURA E. LITTLE, CONFLICT OF LAWS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 702 (2nd
ed. 2018).
160. Id. at 703.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Waste Mgmt., 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)).
165. Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1417–18 (2019).
166. Little, supra note 159, at 703 (emphasis in original).
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impeding the vindication of a federal right.” 167 The Court has also warned that
“obstacle preemption does not justify a ‘freewheeling judicial inquiry’ into
whether state laws are ‘in tension’ with federal objectives, as such a standard
would undermine the principle that ‘it is Congress rather than the courts that
preempts state law.’” 168
In Lamps Plus, Justice Thomas concurred in the opinion’s application of FAA
precedents but voiced skepticism of obstacle preemption, stating, “I remain
skeptical of this Court’s implied pre-emption precedents.” 169 Notably, Justice
Thomas has “criticiz[ed] the Court for ‘routinely invalidat[ing] state laws based
on perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history,
or generalized notions of congressional purposes that are not embodied within
the text of federal law.’” 170 Regardless of how the Court is currently composed,
as it stands in Lamps Plus, the FAA preempts the use of contra proferentem in
a silent or ambiguous arbitration clause through obstacle preemption. 171
V. CONCLUSION
This Note hopes to demonstrate that the Supreme Court should clarify its
stance on class arbitrability and preemptive effects of the FAA on state law when
applied to determine if class arbitrability is available. If it does not take a clear
stance, the Court will continue to grant certiorari to cases asking similar
questions and will issue similarly vague guidance that the lower courts will
struggle to apply.
The author hopes that the Court’s future decisions do not mar the freedom of
contract on this subject and that it will strive to maintain the integrity of a
contract’s contents as much as possible. For the Court to interfere with the
intentions of contracting parties is to interfere with the longstanding American
legal principle of contract party autonomy and should only be contradicted in
extraordinary circumstances.

167. JAY SYKES & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45825, FEDERAL PREEMPTION:
A LEGAL PRIMER 25 (2019).
168. Id. at 26 (quoting Chamber of Com. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 582, 607 (2011)).
169. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1420 (Thomas, J. concurring).
170. JAY SYKES & NICOLE VANATKO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45825, FEDERAL PREEMPTION:
A LEGAL PRIMER 28 (2019) (quoting Wyeth v Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 583 (2009) (Thomas, J.,
concurring)) (some alterations in original).
171. Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415.

